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II.-180 
ADA LITIGATION CANNOT REASONABLY 
ACCOMMODATE PER SE RULES 
Abstract: On September 20, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. held that an employee request-
ing a multi-month leave of absence is not a “qualified individual” employee un-
der the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that such leave is therefore 
not a reasonable accommodation as defined by the ADA. In so doing, the court 
split from its sister circuits and made a bright-line rule that categorically ex-
cludes certain employees with disabilities from protection under the ADA. This 
Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit should have left more room for case 
by case inquiries into the specific circumstances of leave of absence requests to 
align with the underlying purposes of the ADA: providing individualized ac-
commodations to employees with disabilities to ensure they have access to 
equal employment opportunities.  
INTRODUCTION 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), employers 
must provide accommodations to otherwise qualified employees with disabil-
ities that will allow them to perform the essential functions of their jobs.1 The 
ADA provides a non-exhaustive list of what constitutes a reasonable accom-
modation.2 This leaves employers, employees, and the courts to determine 
what accommodations the law requires.3 
In 2017, in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that an individual requesting a multi-month 
leave of absence was not a “qualified individual” for his position and that 
such leave could never be a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.4 This 
bright-line rule clarified what amount of leave employers must provide em-
ployees with disabilities.5 This categorical ruling, however, left no room for 
                                                                                                                           
 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8), 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
 2 Id. § 12111(9); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62 (1990) (noting that the list of reasonable 
accommodations is meant to provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable accommodation 
but is not meant to be a complete list). 
 3 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 62 (explaining that reasonable accommodations are to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis based on particular circumstances). 
 4 Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson II), 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018); Alexandra Mitropoulos, Leave Me Lonely: The Impact of 
Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft and Golden v. IHA on Leaves of Absence under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 2018 EMERGING ISSUES 8604. 
 5 Recent Case: Employment Law—Extended Leave and the ADA—Seventh Circuit Rules That 
a Multimonth Leave of Absence Cannot be a Reasonable Accommodation, 131 HARV. L. REV. 
2463, 2467 (2018) [hereinafter Recent Case: Employment Law]. 
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case by case inquiry into the specific circumstances of cases and went against 
both the purpose of the ADA and the recommendations of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).6 Furthermore, the Seventh 
Circuit split from its sister circuits that utilize factual inquiry when consider-
ing whether or not a leave of absence is a reasonable accommodation.7 
Part I of this Comment develops the background of Severson, including 
the facts, the procedural history, and the legal context for ADA leave of ab-
sence jurisprudence.8 Part II of this Comment discusses the purpose of the 
ADA, the circuit split over leave of absence as a reasonable accommodation, 
EEOC guidance on the issue, and the mixed responses to Severson II’s bright 
line ruling.9 Part III of this Comment analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s misap-
plication of the ADA’s “qualified individual” standard and inappropriate use 
of a per se rule regarding leave of absence, concluding that the court should 
have left room for case by case inquiry when deciding whether or not a multi-
month leave of absence can constitute a reasonable accommodation.10  
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF SEVERSON 
In 2017, the Seventh Circuit in Severson II decided that a multi-month 
leave of absence was not a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.11 Sec-
tion A of this Part develops the facts of Severson II.12 Section B of this Part 
discusses the procedural history of the case from its original filing in district 
court to the Supreme Court’s denial of a writ of certiorari.13 Section C of this 
Part defines the ADA and discusses the state of the law regarding medical 
leave as a reasonable accommodation for disability prior to Severson II.14 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Golden v. Indianapolis Hous. Agency, 698 F. App’x 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2017) (Rovner, 
J., concurring) (stating that the ADA is meant to be flexible and is not the place for per se rules); 
Brief of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plain-
tiff-Appellant and Reversal at 18, Severson II, 872 F.3d 476 (2017) (No. 15-3754), 2016 WL 
1085869, at *18 [hereinafter Brief of the EEOC] (positing that a per se exclusion of leave as a 
possible reasonable accommodation goes against the purpose of the ADA). 
 7 See Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 (holding that a multi-month leave of absence can never be 
a reasonable accommodation); see, e.g., Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that what constitutes a reasonable accommodation requires a fact-specific 
inquiry, and that extended leave may qualify in certain circumstances). 
 8 See infra notes 11–51 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 52–81 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 82–102 and accompanying text. 
 11 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481. 
 12 See infra notes 15–26 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 27–31 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 32–51 and accompanying text. 
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A. Raymond Severson’s Injury and Resulting Loss of Employment 
Plaintiff Raymond Severson had suffered from back issues since 2005 
and began working for the defendant, Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (“Heart-
land”), in 2006.15 Severson was promoted from supervisor to shop superin-
tendent and finally to operations manager.16 On June 5, 2013, Severson 
strained his back before coming into work, worsening his preexisting condi-
tion.17 In a meeting at work that same day, Heartland’s president and general 
manager informed Severson that he was being demoted to a second-shift 
“lead” position.18 After Severson mentioned that he was experiencing back 
pain, Heartland’s president suggested that Severson leave work for the day.19  
Beginning on June 10, Severson submitted his doctor’s notes to Heart-
land indicating that he would be unable to work due to his back pain.20 In 
early July, Severson notified Heartland that he was retroactively exercising 
his right to take a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(the “FMLA”) as of June 5, 2013.21 On August 13, Severson called Heart-
land’s human resources manager and explained that he would be having back 
surgery on August 27, the same day his maximum 12-week FMLA leave 
would expire, and requested an extension of his medical leave.22 On August 
26, Heartland informed Severson that his employment would end when his 
                                                                                                                           
 15 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479; Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson I), 2015 WL 
7113390, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 12, 2015), aff’d, Severson II, 872 F.3d 476, cert. denied, 138 S. 
Ct. 1441. Severson was diagnosed in 2010 with back myelopathy, a compression of the spinal 
cord. Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. He occasionally experienced flare-ups of his back pain that 
made it difficult for him to work at Heartland, a company that produces fixtures used by retail 
stores to display goods. Id.; Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *1. 
16 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. 
17 Id. 
 18 Id.; Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *1. The job description stated that an employee in the 
lead position “performs manual labor in the production area of the plant, operates and trouble-
shoots production machinery, performs minor repairs as necessary, maintains the building, and 
frequently lifts materials and product weighing fifty pounds or more.” Severson II, 872 F.3d at 
479. The second-shift lead is described as a “working lead” position, meaning that the person 
holding the job has general managerial duties but also must assist subordinates with manufactur-
ing tasks, including staging production projects that may involve lifting items weighing between 
thirty and fifty pounds. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *5. 
 19 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *1. Severson accepted the job as second-shift lead but 
never worked in his new assignment due to subsequently requesting leave for back surgery and 
ultimately losing his job. Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. 
 20 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *1. The notes indicated that Severson was suffering from 
multiple herniated and bulging disks in his lumbar spine and was unable to work until further 
notice. Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. He was in frequent contact with Heartland’s general manager 
and human resources manager during this time. Id. 
 21 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *1. 
 22 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. The expected recovery time for such a surgery was at mini-
mum two months. Id. Severson also informed Heartland that there was a possibility he would need 
a second surgery that would require an additional month of leave. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, 
at *2. 
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FMLA leave expired and invited him to reapply to the company when he was 
medically cleared to work again.23 
Severson underwent back surgery on August 27.24 On October 17 his 
doctor gave him partial clearance to return to work with a 20-pound lifting 
restriction, and on December 5 cleared him to return to work without limita-
tion.25 Instead of reapplying for work at Heartland, Severson sued the com-
pany.26 
B. Severson Moves Through the Courts 
In his original complaint with the District Court for the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin, Severson alleged that Heartland failed to reasonably accom-
modate his back injury and therefore his termination constituted discrimina-
tion in violation of the ADA.27 Heartland moved for summary judgment on 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479–80. The human-resources manager presented Severson’s re-
quest for extended leave to the president of Heartland, who decided that Heartland could not ex-
tend Severson’s leave of absence. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2. He made this decision 
because the current second-shift lead was not performing well and therefore Heartland could not 
continue to keep the position open for Severson. Id. The president stated that he considered hiring 
a temporary replacement but decided not to because of the difficulty in finding and training a 
qualified candidate to fill the position temporarily. Id. Severson was informed of this decision by 
phone and follow-up letter. Id. 
 24 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 480. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2. Severson proposed three accommodations that the 
company could have offered him: “(1) a two- or three-month leave of absence; (2) a transfer to a 
vacant job; or (3) a temporary light-duty position with no heavy lifting.” Severson II, 872 F.3d at 
480. Severson also alleged that Heartland intentionally interfered with his rights under the FMLA 
and terminated him in retaliation for exercising those rights. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2. 
Heartland’s counsel drafted a motion for sanctions for violation of FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“Rule 11 
sanctions”), arguing that Severson’s FMLA claims lacked reasonable evidentiary and legal sup-
port. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (creating representations to 
the court made when individuals present pleadings, motions, or other papers to the court); Id. R. 
11(c) (creating sanctions for individuals who violate FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)). Heartland also argued 
that several of Severson’s factual allegations lacked evidentiary support, including the allegation 
that he could have returned to work “immediately” after surgery and that he had informed Heart-
land of this fact. Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2. By letter, Severson agreed to withdraw 
these allegations and his FMLA interference claim. Id. at *3. Heartland’s counsel did not respond 
to this letter, and Severson did not file any notice with the court withdrawing the claims. Id. A few 
weeks before the close of discovery, Heartland filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
FMLA claims and a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Id. Severson’s counsel sent Heartland’s counsel 
an email reminding him that Severson had agreed to withdraw the allegations that he could have 
returned to work immediately and his claim for FMLA interference. Id. Heartland’s counsel re-
fused to stipulate to the agreement for dismissal with prejudice unless Severson agreed that dis-
missal would not prevent Heartland from pursuing Rule 11 sanctions, which Severson would not 
agree to. Id. Severson filed a motion to amend his complaint to withdraw the FMLA claims that 
the district court granted. Id. at *3, *12. The district court also denied Heartland’s motion for 
summary judgment on the FMLA claims and motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at *12. 
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the basis that Severson’s proposed accommodations were not reasonable un-
der the ADA.28 The district court agreed and granted the motion for summary 
judgment.29 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the decision on the 
grounds that a multi-month leave of absence is unreasonable and an employee 
requiring such leave is not protected by the ADA.30 The Supreme Court de-
nied Severson’s petition for writ of certiorari on April 2, 2018.31 
C. Legal Context and State of the Law Regarding  
Reasonable Accommodations 
Title I of the ADA provides that an employer shall not discriminate 
against a “qualified individual” on the basis of disability.32 A qualified indi-
vidual is an employee who can perform the “essential functions” of their posi-
tion with or without accommodations from their employer.33 Employees have 
the burden of proving that they were qualified individuals at the time of an 
adverse employment action.34 
Under the ADA, discrimination includes failure to make reasonable ac-
commodations for the disabilities of an “otherwise qualified” employee that 
are known to the employer unless the employer can demonstrate that the ac-
commodation would be unduly burdensome.35 The ADA includes a list of 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *2; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (stating that failure to 
make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities, absent a showing that such an 
accommodation would impose an undue burden on the employer, constitutes illegal discrimina-
tion). 
 29 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *11. 
 30 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479. 
 31 Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018). 
 32 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). 
 33 Id. § 12111(8) (“the term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job”). Under § 12111(8), an 
employer’s judgment as to which job functions are essential is considered when determining 
whether an employee is a qualified individual. Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applies a 
two-step test to determine whether an individual is qualified, looking first at whether the individu-
al has the proper prerequisites for the position and second at whether the individual can perform 
the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodations. Stern v. St. 
Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 285 (7th Cir. 2015). The “qualified individual” test and 
related “essential functions” requirement are important particularly in cases like Severson II, 
where the defendant argues that attendance is an essential function of the job. E. Pierce Blue, Job 
Functions, Standards, and Accommodations Under the ADA: Recent EEOC Decisions, 9 ST. LOU-
IS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 19, 23 (2015). Once an “essential function” argument like this is 
accepted, the employer is no longer required to consider accommodations because the employee is 
not “qualified” and therefore not protected by the ADA. Id. 
 34 Severson I, 2015 WL 7113390, at *3. 
 35 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). To determine whether an accommodation would result in “undue 
hardship,” an employer may consider whether the accommodation will impose significant difficul-
ty or expense given factors such as the nature and cost of the accommodation, the overall financial 
resources of the employer, and more. Id. § 12111(10). 
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what may constitute a reasonable accommodation but does not elaborate on 
what it must include.36 Nevertheless, the “baseline requirement” is that a rea-
sonable accommodation is one that allows a qualified employee with a disa-
bility to perform the essential functions of the job.37 
In 2002, in U.S. Airways Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court provided 
some clarification of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation.38 The 
plaintiff in Barnett injured his back while on the job and was temporarily 
transferred to a less physically demanding position in the mailroom.39 He 
asked his employer to make an exception to its seniority system to allow him 
to remain in the mailroom position to accommodate his continued limitations, 
but was refused and ultimately fired.40 He sued his employer for violating the 
ADA in refusing to provide the reasonable accommodation of permitting him 
to continue working in the mailroom.41 
The Court utilized a two-step framework to reach its conclusion that vio-
lating the rules of a seniority system to reassign an employee with a disability 
to a different position is not a reasonable accommodation.42 First, the Court 
engaged in a general inquiry into whether or not the proposed accommoda-
tion seemed reasonable on its face, as shown in practice or in precedent and 
concluded that it was not.43 Second, the Court explained that the plaintiff 
could overcome the presumption of unreasonableness if they can show “spe-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. § 12111(9) (emphasis added) (providing numerous examples of potential accommo-
dations, including “other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities”). A reasonable 
accommodation may include “making existing facilities accessible to individuals with disabilities 
. . . job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquiring or modifying equipment or devices, adjusting or modifying examinations, training mate-
rials, or policies, providing qualified readers or interpreters.” Id. This list shows that the concept 
of “reasonable accommodation” is flexible and is meant to contain examples of measures that 
facilitate successful employment, but is not meant to be dispositive. Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2 at 62. 
 37 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). The EEOC regulations define a 
reasonable accommodation as “any change in the work environment or in the way things are cus-
tomarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunity.” 
Blue, supra note 33, at 22 (quoting 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (2015)). 
 38 Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2467; see U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 
535 U.S. 391, 393 (2002) (examining whether a disabled work’s request for a “reasonable ac-
commodation” trumps the employer’s established seniority system). 
 39 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 394–95. The plaintiff’s arguments were specifically that he was an “individual with a 
disability,” that assignment to the mailroom position was a reasonable accommodation, and that 
refusal to provide that accommodation constituted unlawful discrimination. Id. 
 42 Id. at 401–02, 405. 
 43 Id. at 403–04. 
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cial circumstances” for which the accommodation can be reasonable even 
though it is not ordinarily.44 
Despite this guidance from the Supreme Court, Severson II falls within a 
long line of cases in which circuit courts struggle to determine whether or not 
extended medical leave constitutes a reasonable accommodation under the 
ADA.45 Long-term medical leave is typically covered by the FMLA, which 
entitles employees up to 12 weeks of medical leave during any 12-month pe-
riod because of a serious health condition.46 Due to the time constraints of the 
FMLA, cases like Severson II arise when employees request further medical 
leave as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.47 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2468; see Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405 (“[T]he 
plaintiff . . . nonetheless remains free to show that special circumstances warrant a finding that, 
despite the presence of a seniority system (which the ADA may not trump in the run of cases), the 
requested accommodation is reasonable on the particular facts.”). For example, the plaintiff might 
show that the system in question already contains exceptions, such that one further exception is 
unlikely to matter and constitutes a reasonable accommodation in the particular case. Barnett, 535 
U.S. at 405. In 2002, in U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the Supreme Court ultimately held that it is 
presumptively unreasonable for an employer to violate an established seniority system to accom-
modate an employee with disabilities, but remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals to determine whether the accommodation was reasonable under the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. Id. at 406; Michael Creta, Note, The Accommodation of Last Resort: The 
Americans with Disabilities Act and Reassignments, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1708 (2014). 
 45 See Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2463 (describing how leave of absence 
cases are some of the “murkiest waters” of ADA litigation, with Severson II representing a split 
from other circuits on the issue); see, e.g., Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 
123, 127 (1st Cir. 2017) (deciding whether employer’s denial of plaintiff’s request for a year-long 
leave of absence for depression and anxiety constituted discrimination under the ADA); Cleveland 
v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 F. App’x 74, 76, 79 (6th Cir. 2003) (deciding whether it was a violation 
of the ADA for an employer to reject the six month leave request of a pregnant employee with 
lupus). 
 46 Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) 
(2012). An eligible employee under FMLA is one who has been employed for at least twelve 
months and has contributed at least 1,250 hours of service to that employer. Id. § 2611(2)(A). The 
employer must employ at least fifty employees. Id. § 2611(B)(ii). This presents the interesting 
case where an employee who has been employed for only one week may be entitled to a leave of 
absence under the ADA but an employee with the same condition who has been employed for 
eleven months may not be entitled to the same leave of absence under FMLA. Allison Oasis Kahn, 
Navigating the Circuit Split Over Reasonable ADA Leave, LAW360 (Apr. 12, 2018, 11:22 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/employment/articles/1031303/navigating-the-circuit-split-over-
reasonable-ada-leave [https://perma.cc/FNU5-TSTE]; see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (defining an 
eligible employee as one who has worked for the employer for at least one year); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(5)(A) (defining an eligible employee as any employed individual). The FMLA defines a 
“serious health condition” as an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or medical condition that 
involves inpatient care or continuing treatment by a health care provider. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11). 
The ADA defines “disability” as an individual with a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more major life activity of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Individu-
als can therefore have conditions that qualify as both a “serious health impairment” and a “disabil-
ity,” such as Severson’s back injury. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). 
 47 See Severson II, 872 F.3d at 478 (arising out of Severson’s request for an extension of 
FMLA leave as a reasonable accommodation due to his requiring surgery and recovery time). 
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Although courts agree that some amount of leave can constitute a reason-
able accommodation in some circumstances, they have primarily relied on 
fact-specific inquiries to determine just what those circumstances are.48 Alt-
hough the Court in Barnett held that ordinarily, altering a seniority system is 
not a reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff still had an opportunity to show 
that his particular circumstances warranted a finding of reasonableness.49 The 
Seventh Circuit in Severson II broke from the other circuits in holding that a 
multi-month leave of absence is per se unreasonable.50 In so deciding, the 
court also held that a plaintiff requesting a multi-month leave of absence is not 
a “qualified individual” who can perform the essential functions of their job.51 
II. REASONING FOR AND RESPONSES TO REASONABLE  
ACCOMMODATION LITIGATION 
The question of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation is one of 
the ADA’s most convoluted issues of the ADA, and extended leaves of ab-
sence are one of the most highly contested potential accommodations.52 Sec-
tion A of this Part discusses the legislative intent behind the ADA and the criti-
cal need for the provision of reasonable accommodations.53 Section B of this 
Part discusses the current circuit split on requests for multi-month leave of 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See, e.g., Echevarria, 856 F.3d at 128 (quoting Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 
212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000)) (“[W]hether a leave request is reasonable turns on the facts of 
the case.”). 
 49 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405. The court left room for this factual inquiry because, although an 
accommodation might be unreasonable for most employers in the industry, it might nevertheless 
be required of the employer given particular facts, such as if the employer frequently altered its 
seniority system practices. Id. (citing Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 137 (2d 
Cir. 1995)). 
 50 Mitropoulos, supra note 4. A few weeks after Severson II, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its 
position, holding in a second case, Golden v. Indianapolis Housing Agency, that, pursuant to Severson 
II, an individual who requests six months’ additional medical leave is not a qualified individual under 
the ADA and therefore providing such leave is not a reasonable accommodation. Golden v. Indianap-
olis Hous. Agency, 698 F. App’x 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Severson II, 872 F.3d at 478–79). 
 51 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2014, in Hwang v. Kan-
sas State University, also stated that an employee who cannot come to work cannot perform the 
essential functions of the job, holding that a six month leave of absence is not a reasonable ac-
commodation under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 753 F.3d 1159, 1161 (10th Cir. 2014). 
The court stated, however, that when it comes to whether employers are required to offer six 
months or more of leave, the answer is “almost always no.” Id. (emphasis added). The Tenth Cir-
cuit cited Barnett in stating that whether a leave request is reasonable will depend on “the duties 
essential to the job in question, the nature and length of the leave sought, and the impact on fellow 
employees” and stated there may be circumstances in which lengthy leave is more reasonable than 
in others. Id. at 1162. 
 52 Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2467 (“if the Americans with Disabilities 
Act is a ‘swamp of imprecise language,’ then leave-of-absence disputes are fought in its murkiest 
waters”). 
 53 See infra notes 57–61 and accompanying text. 
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absences as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.54 Section C of this 
Part summarizes guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (the “EEOC”) on the issue of leaves of absence.55 Section D of this Part 
summarizes responses to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding.56 
A. Legislative Intent Behind the ADA 
The purpose of the ADA is to rectify the discrimination and disad-
vantages individuals with disabilities face socially, vocationally, economical-
ly, and educationally.57 In enacting the ADA, Congress incorporated many of 
the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a civil rights law that pro-
hibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities.58 The provision of 
reasonable accommodations is a key mandate of the Rehabilitation Act, and 
legislative history reveals that Congress intended the same to be so for the 
ADA.59 When enacting the law in 1990, Congress asserted that accommoda-
tions should address individual needs and rejected amendments that estab-
lished per se rules.60 The ADA requires employers to be flexible and alter 
standard practices to accommodate employees with disabilities.61 
B. Circuit Split on Extended Medical Leave  
as a Reasonable Accommodation 
Rather than employing the ADA’s inherent flexibility, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in 2017, in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson II), held that 
a multi-month leave of absence is per se never a reasonable accommoda-
                                                                                                                           
 54 See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 67–76 and accompanying text. 
 56 See infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text. 
 57 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2012). The discrimination facing individuals with disabilities in-
cludes both “outright intentional exclusion” and “failure to make modifications to existing facili-
ties and practices.” Id. 
 58 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 23 (1990) (stating that the ADA incorporates many of 
the standards of the Rehabilitation Act and giving the reasonable accommodation requirement as a 
specific example); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities by any agency that receives federal funding). 
 59 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 33; see 10 C.F.R. § 4.123 (defining reasonable accommo-
dations under the Rehabilitation Act). The House Committee on Education and Labor highlighted 
that testimony before the Committee indicated that provision of reasonable accommodations was 
critical to accomplishing the purpose of the ADA in allowing individuals with disabilities to par-
ticipate in the “economic mainstream” of society. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34. 
 60 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 39, 41. For example, Congress rejected an amendment that 
would define undue hardship as costing more than 10% of the disabled employee’s salary. Id. at 
41. 
 61 Blue, supra note 33, at 19. Even the language of the EEOC regulations for implementation 
of the ADA indicate a requirement of flexibility in stating that employers may be required to mod-
ify or adjust the way things are customarily done. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(ii) (2015); Blue, supra 
note 33, at 22. 
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tion.62 The decision affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s 2003 holding in Byrne v. 
Avon Products, Inc. that an employee unable to work cannot perform their 
job’s essential functions and therefore is not a qualified individual entitled to 
protection under the ADA.63 
Almost every other circuit has decided ADA leave of absence cases by 
engaging in a factual inquiry into whether the leave of absence would allow 
an employee to perform the essential functions of the job, is “facially reason-
able,” and would not place an undue burden on the employer.64 Many of these 
cases have still resulted in the requested leave being found unreasonable, but 
only given the circumstances of the employer, employee, and the leave in 
question.65 This line of reasoning leaves open the possibility that a multi-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson II), 872 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018) (holding that a multi-month leave of absence is categorically 
outside the scope of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation); Blue, supra note 33, at 19 
(“what the Americans with Disabilities Act requires on employers, in one word, is flexibility”). 
 63 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 (citing Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 
2003)). The court stated that allowing a multi-month leave of absence to constitute a reasonable ac-
commodation would excuse the inability to work rather than allow the employee to perform the du-
ties of the job. Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481. 
 64 See Kieffer v. CPR Restoration & Cleaning Servs., 733 F. App’x 632, 637–38 (3d Cir. 
2018) (holding that the leave requested here was indefinite and therefore not a reasonable accom-
modation that would enable the employee to perform his essential job function) (emphasis added); 
Wenc v. New London Bd. of Educ., 702 F. App’x 27, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (reaffirming that the rea-
sonableness of an employer’s accommodation is a fact-specific question to be resolved by a fact-
finder); Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 132–33 (1st Cir. 2017) (citing Gar-
cia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 648 (1st Cir. 2000)) (holding that an employ-
ee is required to show that the proposed accommodation would enable her to perform the essential 
functions of her job and that it is feasible for the employer under the circumstances); Moss v. 
Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413, 418, 419 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that, alt-
hough time off can be a reasonable accommodation, the employer was not required to provide 
leave to a disabled employee who did not provide a specified date to return to work); Santandreu 
v. Miami Dade Cty., 513 F. App’x 902, 905–06 (11th Cir. 2013) (because employee was unable to 
indicate when he would return to work, additional leave was not a reasonable accommodation 
despite the fact that in some cases it could be); Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 F. App’x 74, 
78–79, 81 (6th Cir. 2003) (specifically declining to adopt a bright-line rule for what amount of 
leave can constitute a reasonable accommodation and holding that summary judgment was inap-
propriate in determining six months’ leave was unreasonable given the circumstances). 
 65 See, e.g., Echevarria, 856 F.3d at 132–33 (holding that whether a leave request is reasona-
ble is a fact-specific inquiry and that the plaintiff was not able to meet her burden of showing her 
request was reasonable given her circumstances). In 2017, in Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharma-
ceuticals LP, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff employee continued to ex-
tend her medical leave for five months while being treated for depression and ultimately requested 
an additional twelve months before being terminated from her position. Id. at 123–26. The court 
considered the length of the leave, the amount of leave already provided, the lack of medical doc-
umentation provided to the employer, and the employer’s typical practices when it comes to leave. 
Id. at 129–31. The court ultimately stated that the employee failed to show that her requested leave 
was facially reasonable in either the circumstances of her case or in the run of cases. Id. at 128. 
The court specifically declined, however, to state that the same amount of leave would be unrea-
sonable in every case, limiting the decision to the facts of the case at hand. Id. at 132–33. 
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month leave of absence can constitute a reasonable accommodation under 
some circumstances and requires a fact-specific inquiry.66 
C. EEOC Guidance on Leaves of Absence 
Congress tasked the EEOC with interpreting, administering, and enforc-
ing the ADA.67 The EEOC has addressed granting leave as a reasonable ac-
commodation and stated that providing medical leave that enables the em-
ployee to return to work once the leave has ended is a reasonable accommo-
dation.68 
In its brief as amicus curiae on behalf of Severson, the EEOC argued 
that the district court should have considered whether Severson could perform 
the essential functions of his job as of the date of his projected return to 
work.69 The EEOC’s position was that accommodation of a leave of absence 
is only fully achieved at the end of the leave period, so the relevant inquiry 
should have been whether, at the end of the leave, Severson would be able to 
perform the essential functions of his job.70 
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning from its 2002 decision in U.S. 
Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the EEOC further argued that medical leave is a “fa-
cially feasible” accommodation under the ADA.71 Although not every request 
for leave will be reasonable, the EEOC reasoned that Severson’s request was 
time limited, definite, requested in advance, and that he would likely be able 
to go back to performing his regular duties upon his return.72 The EEOC con-
cluded that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that Severson’s re-
                                                                                                                           
 66 See, e.g., Cehrs v. Ne. Ohio Alzheimer’s Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 782, 783 (6th Cir. 
1998) (stressing the need for individualization under the ADA in holding that there should be no 
presumption that uninterrupted attendance is always an essential job requirement nor that per se 
rules should dictate that lengthy or even indefinite leave can never constitute a reasonable accom-
modation). 
 67 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(1); 12117(a). 
 68 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EMPLOYER-PROVIDED LEAVE AND THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 2 (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/upload/
ada-leave.pdf [https://perma.cc/3N2A-UB2G]. 
 69 Brief of the EEOC, supra note 6, at 10. 
 70 Id. at 11–12. The EEOC cautioned that any other interpretation would necessitate a finding 
that “no employee who was forced by disability to take medical leave could ever be a qualified 
individual under the ADA.” Id. at 12 (quoting Donelson v. Providence Health & Servs., 823 
F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189–90 (E.D. Wash. 2011)). Such an approach would be inconsistent with the 
EEOC’s longstanding understanding of the ADA as including leave as a reasonable accommoda-
tion. Id. at 14. Furthermore, finding that an employee requesting a leave of absence is never a 
qualified individual would preclude the court from ever considering the reasonableness of a spe-
cific leave request. Id. at 18. 
 71 Id. at 21 (“[L]eave generally is reasonable where it is of definite, time-limited duration, 
requested in advance, and likely to enable the employee to perform the essential job functions 
when he or she returns.”). 
 72 Id. at 21–22. 
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quest for extended leave was a facially reasonable accommodation and he 
was therefore a qualified individual entitled to protection under the ADA.73 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the EEOC’s reasoning as mistakenly equat-
ing a reasonable accommodation with an effective accommodation.74 The 
court reasoned that just because a long-term medical leave might effectively 
allow an employee to return to work at its conclusion does not mean it is a 
reasonable accommodation that will allow the employee to perform the es-
sential functions of his job.75 The court held that such long-term medical 
leave should be left to the FMLA, reasoning that to follow the EEOC’s rec-
ommendation would be to turn the ADA into a medical-leave statute.76 
D. Responses to the Seventh Circuit’s Per Se Rule 
The Severson II categorical ruling has been praised as a “holy grail” for 
employers that provides clear guidelines for extended leave requests.77 Em-
ployers now have a predictable answer and easily applicable rule when it 
comes to whether or not they are obligated to provide multi-month leaves of 
absence under the ADA.78 
Others criticize the lack of flexibility inherent in such a per se, categori-
cal ruling that a multi-month leave of absence can never be a reasonable ac-
commodation.79 In his concurring opinion in Golden v. Indianapolis Housing 
Agency, decided only a few weeks after Severson II, Judge Rovner  of the 
Seventh Circuit wrote that a per se rule that applies without consideration of 
whether the leave would cause any hardship to the employer is “nonsensi-
cal.”80 According to Judge Rovner, the purpose of the ADA is to be flexible 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Id. at 27. There would still be an opportunity for Heartland to prove that the requested ac-
commodation, though reasonable, would create an undue hardship, though the EEOC argues there 
was not enough evidence to compel a jury finding that extending Severson’s medical leave would 
inevitably have imposed an undue hardship. Id. at 30. They cited factual evidence that Heartland 
replaced Severson three months after firing him and only ten days before he was fully cleared to 
return to work. Id. at 29. 
 74 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 482. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. The court distinguished the two laws by stating that the FMLA protected employees 
who sometimes would be unable to perform their job, whereas the ADA “applies only to those 
who can do the job.” Id. at 481 (quoting Byrne, 382 F.3d at 381). 
 77 Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2466; Patrick Dorrian, Employers Get 
‘Holy Grail’ Ruling on Leave as Job Accommodation, BLOOMBERG LAW (Sept. 26, 2017Error! 
Hyperlink reference not valid.), https://www.bna.com/employers-holy-grail-n73014470108/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6FC-QGBT]. 
 78 See Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2466–67 (stating that those in favor of 
the Severson II ruling have lauded “its imposition of clear boundaries in an area of law marked by 
unpredictability.”). 
 79 Id. at 2467. 
 80 Golden v. Indianapolis Hous. Agency, 698 Fed. App’x 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2017) (Rovner, 
J., concurring). 
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and individualized, and analyzing what length of leave is reasonable should 
involve inquiry into the unique circumstances of the employee, the requested 
accommodation, and the burden to the employer.81 
III. THE REAL SEVENTH CIRCUIT SPLIT: DEPARTURE FROM  
THE PURPOSE AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ADA 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ per se rule from its 2017 opinion 
in Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson II) is out of line with the 
ADA’s goal of providing individualized accommodations that allow employ-
ees with disabilities to access equal employment opportunities.82 Section A of 
this Part posits that the Seventh Circuit mischaracterized Severson as an un-
qualified employee under the ADA by analyzing whether he could perform 
the essential duties of his job while out on leave, not as of when he could re-
turn to work.83 Section B of this Part argues that the Seventh Circuit contra-
vened the purpose of the ADA in creating a per se rule that a multi-month 
leave of absence is never a reasonable accommodation because it left no 
room for the flexible, case-by-case inquiry inherent in ADA determinations.84 
A. An Employee Can Request Extended Leave and  
Be a “Qualified Individual” Too 
The Seventh Circuit made a categorical ruling that individuals who can-
not work while out on multi-month leave are not qualified employees under 
the ADA.85 Per EEOC guidance and other circuit courts’ reasoning, whether 
or not an employee is “qualified” should be analyzed at the time that the em-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. The per se rule in Severson II leaves no room for consideration of the plaintiff’s unique 
circumstances. Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2470; see also Severson II, 872 
F.3d at 481 (holding that a multi-month leave of absence can never be a reasonable accommoda-
tion and therefore it is unnecessary to even consider the facts of Severson’s case). Even the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which also stated in its 2014 opinion, in Hwang v. Kansas State Univer-
sity, that an individual who needs extensive leave is not “otherwise qualified,” left some room for 
factual inquiry into the circumstances of the case. 753 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]aking extensive time off work may be more problematic, say, for a medical professional who 
must be accessible in an emergency than for a tax preparer who’s just survived April 15.”). 
 82 See Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson II), 872 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2017), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441 (2018) (holding that a multi-month leave of absence can never be a 
reasonable accommodation); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 69 (1990) (stating that a reasonable 
accommodation should be tailored to the individualized circumstances of the particular employee 
and employer); Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2470 (positing that the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Severson II “should not have foreclosed consideration of the plaintiff’s 
individual circumstances”). 
 83 See infra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 91–102 and accompanying text. 
 85 Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481. 
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ployee is set to return to work, not during the time they will be absent.86 A 
qualified individual under the ADA is someone who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job.87 Under 
this reasoning, many circuits have held that an employee who requests indef-
inite leave without a return date has not shown that they are qualified because 
there is no evidence that they will be able to resume the essential functions of 
their position when and if they return to work.88 As long as a leave request is 
time limited, definite, likely to allow the employee to engage in the essential 
functions of the position upon return, and adequately communicated to the 
employer, however, the employee remains qualified under the ADA.89 The 
Seventh Circuit should have engaged in factual inquiry into whether Ray-
mond Severson’s request for a leave extension—made two weeks in advance 
of surgery and estimated to last two to three months—met these standards.90 
B. Per Se Rules Do Not Belong in ADA Litigation 
If the Seventh Circuit had determined that Severson’s request was clear 
and time-limited and he was therefore a “qualified individual,” it then would 
have had to consider whether the requested leave was reasonable under the 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999); Brief of the EEOC, 
supra note 6, at 11–12. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1999, in Nunes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., that, in interpreting the “qualified individual” requirement, it is inappropriate to focus 
on the plaintiff’s disability during the period of the medical leave. 164 F.3d at 1247. The EEOC 
stated that although the “qualified” analysis is typically considered at the time of the adverse em-
ployment action, when the requested accommodation is not one that can be immediately fulfilled 
the analysis should be whether or not the employee is qualified upon provision of the accommoda-
tion. Brief of the EEOC, supra note 6, at 11–12. For example, it would be inappropriate to find an 
employee not qualified at the present moment if it will take the employer a month to properly 
modify existing facilities, an accommodation specifically required under the ADA; rather, whether 
or not such an employee is qualified should be analyzed as of the time the modifications are en-
acted. Id. at 11. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 88 See, e.g., Santandreu v. Miami Dade County, 513 Fed. App’x 902, 906 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that, because plaintiff had already taken 15 months of leave and still was not able to pro-
vide a definite date of return to work, he did not meet his burden of proving that he would be able 
to perform the essential functions of the job in the future and therefore was not “qualified”). 
 89 Brief of the EEOC, supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 90 Id. at 22; see Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479 (establishing a per se exclusion of multi-month 
leaves of absence from qualification as a reasonable accommodation rather than inquiring into the 
fats of Severson’s case). The EEOC pointed out that the estimation by Severson’s doctor turned 
out to be true, and that Severson was cleared to return to work three months and a few days after 
his surgery. Brief of the EEOC, supra note 6, at 22. Even Severson, however, conceded that it was 
unlikely he would be able to do the heavy lifting required of his position for some time even after 
returning to work. Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2470; Severson v. Heartland 
Woodcraft, Inc. (Severson I), 2015 WL 7113390, at *9–10 (E. D. Wis. Nov. 12, 2015), aff’d, Sev-
erson II, 872 F.3d 476, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1441. 
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ADA.91 The court’s ruling went against the purpose of the ADA in creating a 
bright-line rule that a multi-month leave of absence is never a reasonable ac-
commodation.92 Accommodations under the ADA should be tailored to the 
individual employee and employer, leaving room for case by case inquiry 
when it comes to the specific facts of a leave of absence case.93 
The foundation of the ADA is a belief that employees with disabilities 
should not be subject to generalized beliefs about their capabilities.94 Congress 
recognized that implementing accommodations and removing obstacles to 
successful employment is an individualized process that may be confusing for 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See Echevarria v. AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 856 F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir. 2017) (stating that if 
the plaintiff is otherwise qualified for the position, she then has the burden of showing that there is 
a reasonable accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of the job and 
would be feasible for the employer); Severson II, 872 F.3d at 479 (holding that an individual who 
cannot work for an extended period of time is not a qualified individual and therefore a multi-
month leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation). 
 92 Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2470 (although the Seventh Circuit made 
future leave-of-absence litigation highly predictable, it left no room for individual consideration of 
the plaintiff’s circumstances); see Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 (stating that a multi-month leave of 
absence excuses not working and therefore is never a reasonable accommodation that allows an 
employee to fulfill the essential functions of their job). Many cases highlight the importance of 
individualized inquiries and strike down blanket policies or exclusions implemented by employ-
ers. See, e.g., EEOC v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 252 F. Supp. 2d 277, 291–92 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (clarify-
ing that a reasonable accommodation inquiry should be made on an individualized, case-by-case 
basis). For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1999, in Holiday v. Chattanooga, 
held that, in making employment decisions, an employer cannot make blanket assumptions about 
whether someone with a particular condition is able to perform a certain job. 206 F.3d 637, 643 
(6th Cir. 1999). Doing so focuses only on beliefs about the particular disorder and not on the indi-
vidual employee and is contrary to the purposes and mandates of the ADA. Id. at 644 (citing Tay-
lor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 1999)). The D.C. Circuit Court held in its 
2014 opinion, in Solomon v. Vilsack, that, when it comes to reasonable accommodations, the “de-
mands of an employment position and the capacities of a workplace can vary materially from 
employer to employer” and therefore it is unusual that any accommodation will be found categori-
cally unreasonable. 763 F.3d 1, 9–10 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 93 See Colleen Coveney, Assessing Leave of Absence Accommodations Under ADA, LAW360 
(Jan. 24, 2018, 11:05 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1004889/assessing-leave-of-absence-
accommodations-under-ada [https://perma.cc/NWQ5-G6VA] (stating that ambiguity around con-
cepts such as reasonable accommodation ensures case-by-case inquiry rather than categorical 
disposition of ADA cases). Even in Severson II, the Seventh Circuit stated that reasonable ac-
commodation is a flexible concept that can include much more than the examples provided in the 
law. 872 F.3d at 481. The ADA’s implementing regulations state that the employer should “initi-
ate an informal, interactive process” to determine what accommodation is appropriate for the par-
ticular employee, and the legislative intent behind the law shows that reasonable accommodation 
inquiries are meant to be individualized. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (stating that an interactive 
process should identify the limitations facing the employee and potential accommodations that 
will allow them to overcome those limitations); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 69 (“by its very 
nature, an accommodation should respond to particular individual’s needs in relation to perfor-
mance of a specific job at a specific location”). The Supreme Court stated in its 1999 opinion, in 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., that individuals with disabilities should be treated as individuals 
rather than “as members of a group having similar impairments.” 527 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999). 
 94 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 58. 
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employers.95 This does not alleviate employers’ duty, however, to engage in an 
individualized inquiry into every request for an accommodation, and the Sev-
enth Circuit should have engaged in factual inquiry when it came to determin-
ing whether the leave of absence request in Severson II was reasonable.96 The 
court’s refusal to do so will leave some employees with disabilities subject to 
the discriminatory practices Congress sought to protect them from.97 
Further, the Seventh Circuit’s holding is contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
guidance from its 2002 opinion in U.S. Airways v. Barnett regarding reasona-
ble accommodations.98 Under the Supreme Court’s two-step inquiry, a multi-
month leave of absence may be presumptively unreasonable in the Seventh 
Circuit, but there would be an opportunity for plaintiffs to show that the spe-
cial circumstances of their case make the request reasonable.99 The employer 
would furthermore still have an opportunity to show that the request would 
cause undue hardship.100 Allowing for consideration of special circumstances 
while creating presumptions against certain accommodations would balance 
employers’ desire for predictability with employees’ right to individualized 
assessment under the ADA.101 Maintaining an opportunity for this flexibility 
would be more in line with EEOC guidance on the issue, the case-by-case 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Id. at 74. 
 96 See id. at 58 (“[C]overed entities are required to make employment decisions based on facts 
applicable to individual applicants or employees.”). Congress intended for inquiry into whether an 
accommodation is reasonable to be individualized and determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 
62. 
 97 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. The findings and purposes of the ADA include the fact that indi-
viduals with disabilities face various forms of discrimination, including failure of employers to 
make modifications to existing policies. Id. § 12101(5). The ADA was implemented to combat the 
economic and vocational disadvantages facing individuals with disabilities. Id. § 12101(6). Indi-
viduals with disabilities are supposed to be treated as just that—individuals—rather than as a 
group, and making a per se rule subjects an entire class of people to identical treatment. See Sut-
ton, 527 U.S. at 483–84 (stating that employees with disabilities should not be simply looked at as 
similar members of a common group but as individuals with unique needs); Blue, supra note 
3333, at 23 (positing that the ADA requires employees to be amenable to changing standard prac-
tices in response to disabled employees’ individual needs). 
 98 See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002) (holding that an employee is 
entitled to an opportunity to show that the specific facts of their case make an accommodation 
reasonable even if ordinarily it would not be); Severson II, 872 F.3d at 481 (holding without any 
consideration into the facts of the case that a multi-month leave of absence is not a reasonable 
accommodation); Recent Case: Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2469 (stating that under Bar-
nett, courts are “encouraged to draw presumptive lines” not to make bright-line rules, and the 
Severson II court should have followed suit). 
 99 Recent Case, Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2469; see Barnett, 535 U.S. at 405 (hold-
ing that plaintiffs retain an opportunity to prove that special circumstances warrant a finding that a 
certain accommodation is reasonable even if it typically would not be); Severson II, 872 F.3d at 
481 (stating that multi-month leaves of absence are unreasonable because they excuse not working 
rather facilitate successful work). 
 100 Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401, 402. 
 101 Recent Case, Employment Law, supra note 5, at 2469. 
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approach taken by the Seventh Circuit’s sister circuits, and the purpose of the 
ADA.102 
CONCLUSION 
The ADA is not the place for bright line rules that certain accommoda-
tions can never be reasonable. Congress created the law to promote the idea 
that individuals ought to be judged on the basis of their actual abilities, not on 
generalized ideas about what they can and cannot do. Given that intent, the 
Seventh Circuit inappropriately held that an employee who requires a multi-
month medical leave of absence is categorically not a “qualified individual.” 
Doing so excludes an entire group of employees from employment and pro-
tection under the ADA without any consideration of the circumstances of the 
employee, employer, or leave request. Employees who request a lengthy but 
time-limited amount of leave that is likely to allow them to return to work at 
its conclusion should be considered qualified individuals and the court then 
needs to consider whether the requested leave is reasonable. Rather than cre-
ating a bright-line rule, the Seventh Circuit should have engaged in the Su-
preme Court’s two-part inquiry into whether or not an accommodation is rea-
sonable: first, examine whether or not extended medical leave is reasonable in 
the run of cases, and if not, make a factual inquiry into whether or not the 
particular leave can still be reasonable given the circumstances of the case. 
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 102 See Golden v. Indianapolis Hous. Agency, 698 F. App’x 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2017) (Rovner, 
J., concurring) (stating that the ADA is meant to be “flexible and individualized” and requires 
factual determinations of undue hardship and reasonableness of accommodations rather than 
bright-line rules); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 652 (1st Cir. 2000) (“it 
is wrong to say categorically that leave can never be a reasonable accommodation”); EEOC v. 
Prevo’s Family Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d 1089, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that the purpose of the 
ADA is “to prohibit employers from making adverse employment decisions based on stereotypes 
and generalizations associated with the individual’s disability rather than on the individual’s actual 
characteristics”); H.R. REP. NO.101-485, pt. 2, at 69 (stating that accommodations are meant to 
reflect both individual needs and the requirements of the specific job); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OP-
PORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 68, at 2 (highlighting that the reasonable accommodation re-
quirement means that employers must change the way things are customarily done to provide 
access to employment for individuals with disabilities); see also Coveney, supra note 93 (“[T]he 
question of whether leave of a particular duration would pose an undue hardship is a separate 
inquiry and will always depend on the particular circumstances and the employer’s resources.”). 
